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REPRESENTATION PROBLEMS UNDER THE
NEW YORK STATE LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
WALTER P. ARENWAU* Am DONALD M. LANDAYtTHE development and administration of a comprehensive system
of labor legislation in the state of New York since 1937 is a
valuable model which deserves more attention than it has yet
received. The most important statute in this system is the New York
State Labor Relations Act,' enacted in 1937 in order to guarantee to
workers employed in industries engaged in commerce within the state
of New York the same rights that the National Labor Relations Act guar-
antees to employees in industries engaged in interstate commerce.2
The general objectives of the New York act are: (i) to enable workers
to form, join, or assist labor organizations; (2) to provide government
machinery for the investigation of questions or controversies concerning
representation and for the certification of representatives; and (3) to bind
the employer to bargain collectively in good faith with the duly desig-
nated representatives of his employees. The terms of the New York act
are not identical with those of the Wagner Act, because in enacting the
state statute the legislature was able to profit to some extent by the ex-
periences of the National Labor Relations Board. The New York act is
administered by the New York State Labor Relations Board, composed
of three members appointed by the Governor for terms of six years. At
* A.M., Economics, University of Chicago, i94o.
t Assistant Economist, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor.
This article is based on material collected by Mr. Arenwald during the summer of 1939
when he was privileged to examine the case files of the New York State Labor Relations Board
and to interview members of its staff. Mr. Landay's contributions relate more especially to
recent developments. The authors are indebted for many valuable suggestions to Harry A.
Millis, Chairman Emeritus of the Department of Economics, University of Chicago, now
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board. The authors alone, however, are responsible
for the conclusions reached and the recommendations formulated.
xN.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1940) c. 50, § 700 et seq. Further references to the act
will be indicated by section citations only.
2 Section 715 of the act precludes its application to any employer who agrees with the board
that its employees are protected by the National Labor Relations Act. In the absence of such
an agreement, the state act may be enforced against employers participating in both interstate
and intrastate commerce, at least until the state board's jurisdiction is displaced by the NLRB.
Davega City Radio, Inc. v. SLRB, 28i N.Y. 13, 22 N.E. (2d) 145 (1939).
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the time of the formation of the board in July 1937, the state was for-
tunate in obtaining the services as members of three men with previous
experience on the staff of the NLRB.3 In contrast to the NLRB, the
SLRB has been the subject of little unfavorable comment by employers
or by the New York State Federation of Labor (AFL), and it has fre-
quently been praised by the State Industrial Council (CIO). More im-
portant, it has won the public approbation of a legislative committee
appointed to investigate it. 4 This successful record enhances the value of
a study of those policies of the SLRB which have differed considerably
from the adversely-criticized corresponding policies of the NLRB.
The first part of this article will attempt to examine and evaluate in
the light of three years of experience two significant provisions of the
New York act not found in the Wagner Act: the provision for petitions
by employers and the craft-unit proviso. The remainder of the article will
endeavor to describe the evolution of and evaluate the policy of the
SLRB regarding elections to determine the appropriate bargaining unit
and its policy regarding the form of ballot employed in elections and
run-offs.S
THE EMEPL)YER PETITION
The rules of the SLRB, like those of the NLRB, provide for the initia-
tion of representation proceedings by the filing of petitions requesting the
board to make an investigation and to certify the representatives desig-
nated by the employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. Neither
board has ever questioned the right of an employee or of any person or
labor organization acting on behalf of employees to file a petition; in fact
a vast majority of the representation cases have been initiated by em-
ployee petitions. In certain unusual situations, however, the employer
desires to initiate board proceedings at a time when none of the labor
3 Dr. John P. Boland, chairman, Paul M. Herzog, and John D. Moore. In January 194',
George L. Cassidy, an editorial writer of the New York Post, was appointed to fill the vacancy
caused by the death of Mr. Moore. During 1937 the board had a staff of 23 persons, which was
increased to 52 in 1938 and 69 in 1939.
4 Report of the New York State joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor
Relations, Legislative Doc. No. 57, at 23 (1940).
s The present article thus deals with but a part of the board's activities, that concerned with
representation. For a description of cooperative action by the SLRB and the New York State
Board of Mediation see Arenwald, Mediation, Arbitration, and Investigation of Industrial
Disputes in New York State, 1937-40, 49 J. of Pol. Econ. 59 (1941). A more comprehensive
discussion of the activities of these two boards is to be found in Arenwald, Labor Relations
Legislation and its Administration in New York State, 1937-1939 (unpublished manuscript,
194o), which is available in the libraries of the SLRB, the NLRB, and the University of Chi-
cago.
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organizations involved is sufficiently confident of commanding a majority
to file a petition. Although nothing in the Wagner Act forbids the exten-
sion to employers of the right to petition, during the first four years of its
history the NLRB refused to grant this right to employers. This refusal
was interpreted by unfriendly critics as evidence that the act was one-
sided and that the board was biased in favor of unions. Such adverse
criticism was probably in large measure responsible for the issuance on
July x, i939, of new rules permitting employers to file petitions which,
however, must contain
a brief statement setting forth that a question or controversy affecting commerce has
arisen concerning the representation of employees in that two or more such labor
organizations have presented to the employer conflicting claims that each represents
a majority of the employees in the unit or units set forth above ..... 6
When the New York legislature enacted the State Labor Relations
Act in May 1937, it was able to estimate the significance of this prob-
lem, and the state act, by authorizing the board to proceed upon an em-
ployer's allegation that there is a question or controversy concerning rep-
resentation, confers upon employers the right to petition. The rules
of the SLRB have at all times permitted an employer to petition even
when but one union claims to represent a majority of the employees.
Throughout the history of the SLRB, however, restrictions have been
imposed upon employers to prevent abuse of their right to petition. Dur-
ing the first two years there was a significant difference between the pro-
vision authorizing the board to act upon an employer petition and that
authorizing it to act upon an employee petition. The original terminology
provided that:
Whenever it is alleged by an employee or his representative that there is a question
or controversy concerning the representation of employees, the board shall investigate
such question or controversy and certify in writing to all persons concerned the name
or names of the representatives who have been designated or selected. Whenever it is
alleged by an employer or his representative that there is a question or controversy
concerning the representation of employees, the board may investigate such question
or controversy after a public hearing held upon due notice.7
At the outset the SLRB interpreted the difference between "shall" and
"may" as authorizing the adoption of a general policy of conservatism in
deciding whether or not to proceed with an investigation when petitioned
by an employer. The proviso that upon an employer petition the board's
investigation shall follow a public hearing after due notice has no special
6 National Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regulations (Series 2, as amended, March ii,
1940) § 203.2 b(5).
7 § 7os(3) (italics added).
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significance, because this requirement has been construed by the board
to apply to both employer and employee petitions, and the board has not
proceeded formally with any petition except with the consent of the par-
ties.
In the interest of justice to employers caught between conflicting claims
of rival labor unions, the Ives Committee recommended that the legisla-
ture make it mandatory for the board to investigate all cases initiated
by employer petitions.8 Consequently in April 194o, the act was amended
by changing "may" to "shall" in the sentence authorizing action upon
employer petitions. 9 This amendment has probably not caused any sig-
nificant alteration in the methods developed by the board for handling
employer petitions.I°
A significant restriction upon the right of employers to petition is im-
posed by the provision in the act that "no election shall be directed by the
board solely because of the request of the employer or of the employees
prompted thereto by their employer."' ,, In the Interborough Fur Storage
Co. case 2 the board indicated its attitude regarding the extent of this
limitation. In that case both the Fur Merchants Union and the Inde-
pendent Cold Storage Workers Union claimed to represent a majority of
the employees, but only the employer filed a petition. The board found:
Counsel for the Independent stated that that organization desired to have the Board
proceed with its investigation in this matter. The Direction of Election herein is,
therefore, not "solely because of the request of the employer" and not within the
prohibition of Section 705(4) of the Act. The claim of counsel for the Fur Merchants
Union that the Board should not exercise its jurisdiction in the premises is without
merit, and his motion in that respect has accordingly been denied.3
8 Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor
Relations, Legislative Doc. No. 57, at 24-25 (1940).
9 § 7o5(3), amended by N.Y.L. (1940), c. 750.
10 The increase in the proportion of employer petitions from 5 per cent of all petitions filed
in the fiscal year 1939-40 to 9 per cent in the last six months of i94o might, at least in part, be
attributed to this amendment. See notes 14 and x5 infra.
," § 705(4).
12 SEE-28 94, Decision No. 572 (June 30, 1939). The board has adopted a system of classify-
ing its cases according to regions and types. The first letter which precedes the case number
(S, C, or W) indicates whether the case arose in the southern, central, or western region of
New York. The following letter or letters indicate the type of case. U stands for "unfair"
and indicates an unfair labor practice. E stands for "election" and indicates a representation
case which was initiated by an employee petition. EE stands for "employer election" and
indicates a representation case which was initiated by an employer petition. In each region the
cases are numbered consecutively in the order in which the petitions and charges are received.
X3SEE-2894, Decision No. 572, at 3 (June 3o, 1939).
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The direction of an election in this case shows that the board believes
that it can hold an election at the request of an employer if, and only if,
at least one of the labor organizations involved indicates a desire for an
investigation.
A striking aspect of the SLRB's experience is the fact that so few em-
ployer petitions have been filed. During the first 32 months of the board's
history (July I, 1937 to March i, 1940) 2,962 petitions were filed by
unions and only 113 by employers, the latter thus constituting but 3.35
per cent. 4 Of these 113 cases, 44 involved controversies between an AFL
and a CIO union, 25 involved an AFL or a CIO affiliate and an inde-
pendent union, one was a dispute among an AFL, a CIO, and an inde-
pendent union, and the remaining 43 involved only one union.,5
Informal conferences have revealed that many employers are unaware
of their right to petition the state board. This may be due to the pub-
licity given the ITRB's original refusal to accept employer petitions, or
it may be that many employers have considered any labor board to be
inevitably biased, and rather than to call for intervention by an agency
which might discover unfair labor practices or compel genuine collective
bargaining, they have preferred to risk the consequences of allowing a
representation controversy to take its course. The dearth of employer pe-
titions under the New York act indicates that the denial of the right to
petition has probably not been a bona fide grievance against the Wagner
Act and the NILRB. 6 But since employers are prima fade denied a right
granted to employees, the battle cry of discrimination has an apparent
justification and has served as a convenient wedge to open the way for
more drastic proposals which would effectively cripple the NLRB and
nullify the Wagner Act.
The employer petition cases are of two types, those involving only one
14 During the ten months from March i to December 31, 1940, an additional 862 petitions
were filed by unions and 51 by employers. The proportion of employer petitions has thus in-
creased slightly, amounting during the first forty-two months of the board's history to 4.3
per cent.
1S Seven of the additional 51 cases filed between March i, 194o and December 31, 1940 in-
volved claims to representation by both CIO and AFL affiliates, 9 involved either an AFL or
CIO affiliate and an independent union, and 35 involved only one union. The large increase in
single-union cases may in part be attributed to the amendment of § 705(3) which became effec-
tive in April i94o. See note 9 supra.
16 Despite the assertion of the Smith Committee investigating the NLRB that "the restric-
tions placed about the submission of such employer petitions were extremely onerous," the
present authors believe that the lack of a real need for employer petitions almost fully ex-
plains the filing of but one such petition by March 4, I94o. See Final Report of the House of
Representatives Committee to Investigate the NLRB 470-71, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (Bureau
of Nat'l Affairs, Dec. 28, 1940).
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union, and a second group involving two or more unions. In one group
of single-union cases the employer seeks an election before completion ol
the union's organizing campaign in order to damage the prestige of the
union by proving that it does not represent a majority, and thus to avoid
a certification obligating him to bargain collectively. Fear of the prob-
lems involved in this situation was apparently responsible for the NLRB's
refusal to accept any employer petitions prior to July 14, 1939, and for its
present refusal to accept such petitions in cases involving only one union.
The first step of the SLRB in these cases has been to ascertain in the in-
formal conference stage whether or not the union will consent to an elec-
tion or card comparison. The SLRB has exercised great tact in cases
where the refusal of the union to consent has made the direction of an
election impossible since the proceedings would be "solely because of the
request of the employer." The SLRB has never disposed of a single-
union case by issuing a formal decision,17 for it believes that an informal
letter explaining that it has no power to proceed creates a more favorable
impression and avoids unfavorable publicity. Files of the SLRB indicate
that following the initial informal conferences many such cases have
been allowed to remain open but inactive for many weeks and even
months, apparently with the intention of letting them die of old age, a
result which has been frequently achieved., Although this dilatory pro-
cedure might have dangerous consequences if applied generally, it has
proved an effective device for protecting organizing campaigns from em-
ployer interference.
In some of these single-union cases employers have filed petitions in the
hope that following defeat of the union in an election they might obtain
injunctions restraining picketing. For the first two and one-half years of
the board's existence, the decision in the Crawford Clothes case 9 seemed to
X7 The board took formal action on only i8 of the 113 employer petitions filed during the
first thirty-two months. The success of the SLRB in informally settling so many cases initiated
by employer petitions is in line with its record of settling without resort to formal action
91.4 per cent of the 6,045 cases submitted to it during the first three and one-half years.
is Examples are New Amsterdam Laundry (SEE-3356) and Albany Public Market (CEE-
so).
If the Smith Committee investigating the NLRB had made a more careful analysis of
"the deliberate use of dilatory methods" by the board it might have found that these tactics
promoted conciliation and mediation rather than that they "induced and protracted a large
number of industrial disputes." See Report, op. cit. supra note 16, at 496.
19 Crawford Clothes, Inc. v. Frankel, 98 N.Y.L.J. 637 (S. Ct., Sept. ix, 1937). In this case
an AFL union which had lost an SLRB election picketed while the employer negotiated a con-
tract with the CIO union. Justice Poletti held that a labor dispute existed within the meaning
of the New York State "Norris-LaGuardia" act and refused to grant an injunction. Cf. Stalban
v. Friedman, 259 App. Div. 520, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 978 (i94o).
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indicate that the courts would probably refuse to enjoin picketing by a
union which had lost an SLRB election.20 On the basis of this precedent
the SLRB effectively discouraged some employers who informally in-
quired concerning their right to petition.
In addition to quashing employer petitions brought to damage the
prestige of a union, the SLRB has dosed many other single-union cases
in which it lacked the power to take formal action, because the employer
alone had requested proceedings. In nine of the forty-three cases the filing
of an employer petition has led to an informal conference culminating
in a general understanding as to settlement of the controversy. The pro-
vision for employer petitions is thus a valuable device for obtaining speedy
submission of such disputes to an impartial government agency. In each
of these nine cases (as well as in four others where some agreement was
reached by direct negotiations between the parties while the board held
the case in abeyance) the employer subsequently withdrew his petition.
The board dosed four other single-union cases by sending informal letters
of dismissal to the parties, and in two cases informal conferences resulted
in agreements for consent elections.
Moreover, in eleven of these forty-three cases the union and the em-
ployer at all times agreed that the union did not represent a majority of
the employees. There being no question or controversy concerning rep-
resentation, the board could not proceed formally, and all of these cases
were dosed by withdrawal or dismissal of the petition. Four are of spe-
cial interest, however, because they arose out of attempts by unions to
organize employers rather than employees.21 By "organizing employers
rather than employees" is meant the tactic of compelling the employer to
sign a closed-shop contract regardless of how few of his employees are
union members. If the employer refuses to sign, the union pickets the
20 In Euclid Candy Co., Inc. v. Summa, 174 Misc. xg, i9 N.Y.S. (2d) 382 (S. Ct. 1940),
Justice Daly declared that there was no labor dispute within the meaning of the anti-injunction
act because the labor dispute terminated with the certification of the independent union by
the NLRB. An injunction was therefore granted restraining the AFL union which lost the
election from picketing the employer to induce him to break his closed-shop contract with
the independent union. This decision was affirmed without opinion by the appellate division,
second department, in 259 App. Div. 1o8, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 614 (1940). It was followed by the
lower court in Kings County in Florsheim Shoe Store Co., Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union
of Brooklyn and Queens, Local 287, io4 N.Y.L.J. 2189 (S. Ct., Dec. 24, i94o). Thus the doc-
trine applied by the appellate division in the second department is the opposite of that applied
by the appellate division in the first department. As yet no case has been taken to the court
of appeals, and the law therefore remains unsettled.
2M1orris Lunch (CEE-77); Famous Lunch Bar (CEE-4 6); Lynn's Food Shops (SEE-3oso);
and George Kern & Son, Inc. (SEE-1743 , SEE-3 665).
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plant. If the employer signs, the union may have succeeded in "organiz-
ing" the establishment without troubling to persuade a single employee
of the advantages of joining the union.
Because it could find no question or controversy concerning representa-
tion and because any election would have been "solely at the request of
the employer," the board could not proceed formally, but could only hold
these cases in abeyance. In two the employers finally yielded to the pres-
sure of the picket line and signed dosed-shop contracts, and in one the em-
ployer withdrew his petition and negotiated directly with the union. In
the remaining case the employer went out of business, but there is no evi-
dence that the dilatory tactics of the board were primarily responsible for
this result.
The problem of policy presented by the tactic of "organizing employers
rather than employees" was most dearly revealed in the George Kern
case. 2 There a union which frankly admitted that it represented none
of his employees, eventually compelled a meat packer to sign a closed-
shop contract by picketing at the points of retail distribution. The em-
ployer petitioned the SLRB because of fear that if he signed a closed-
shop contract he would be committing an unfair labor practice,23 and the
union responded that it was merely protecting existing contracts with the
majority of the other employers in the industry. In the opinion of the
authors, a union is justified in picketing in an attempt to induce a major-
ity of the employees in a shop to join it. But there should be some restraint
upon picketing which is designed to induce consumers to refrain from
purchasing the employer's product and thus to compel him to sign a
dosed-shop or exclusive bargaining contract which imposes collective bar-
gaining upon employees who do not desire it. In order to have stable,
democratically-controlled unions, employees must be educated to the val-
ue of collective bargaining. They must not be coerced into collective ac-
tion. In the Kern case, therefore, the union should have been compelled
to confine its picketing to the manufacturer's plant.
The SLRB might be able to discourage "organizing employers rather
than employees" by directing an election in such a situation and then, on
the basis of that precedent, by threatening elections if the unions persist
in demanding closed-shop contracts and yet fail to attempt seriously to
organize the employees. To adopt this policy, the board would have to
interpret more liberally the statutory authorization of employer petitions.
If adequate evidence were submitted by either the employer or the indi-
vidual employees showing that a substantial number of employees did not
- SEE-1743, SEE-,3665. 23 § 704(5).
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desire to be represented by the union but did desire an election, the board
might find that, although the union refused to consent, an election would
not be "solely at the request of the employer."
The second major group of employer petition cases involves two or
more unions. A question or controversy concerning representation may
or may not exist. In general the SLRB has handled more expeditiously
cases in which a real representation question arose than any other type of
case initiated by an employer petition. It has attempted to grant quick re-
lief to petitioning employers "caught in the middle" of a genuine represen-
tation controversy.
The employer's right to petition has proved particularly valuable in
these cases because the filing of a petition has frequently resulted in bring-
ing representatives of all parties together for the first time. In an infor-
mal conference at the board's offices an examiner prepared to act as a
mediator will first attempt to obtain the consent of all parties to an elec-
tion. In five of the seventy employer petition cases involving more than
one union which were filed between July i, 1937 and March i, i94o,
stipulations for consent elections were signed.24 More impressive is the
fact that in at least fourteen other cases a general settlement of the con-
troversy was reached during or after the board's informal conference.25
Three employer petitions were dismissed upon the board's finding that it
lacked jurisdiction because a substantial element of interstate commerce
was involved, and another two were informally dismissed for non-prosecu-
tion. That the SLRB found it necessary to direct elections in only five of
these cases reveals its striking success in achieving informal settlements.26
94 Quality Laundry Service, Inc. (SEE-211); Bristol Pharmacy, Inc. (SEE-596); West-
more Restaurant (SEE-393 I); Yonkers New System Laundry (SEE-39 9 4); and Payman
Drugs, Inc. (SEE-4721).
2S In each of these cases the petition was subsequently withdrawn by the employer or was
dismissed by informal letters after the controversy had been settled without an election or
card comparison.
26 lnterborough Fur Storage (SEE-289 4, Decision No. 572, June 3o, 1939); Varick Machine
and Tool Works, Inc. (SEE-121r, Decision No. 227, Aug. 29, 1938); Precision Inductance
Corp. (SEE-ioi 3 , Decision No. 274, Feb. 23, 1938); and Knickerbocker Laundries (SEE-378,
Decision No. 93, Feb. ii, 1938). In all except the first case, discussed above at p. 474, petitions
were also filed by one or more of the labor organizations involved. The board subsequently
dismissed the petitions in the Square Transportation case because the employer had gone
out of business. Decision No. 2 74-B (Oct. 24, 1938). No election was actually held in Knicker-
bocker Laundries because the eleventh hour withdrawal of the AFL union made it possible to
settle the matter by means of a card comparison.
The SLRB has successfully cooperated with the state Board of Mediation to facilitate
voluntary settlements. Arenwald, Mediation, Arbitration, and Investigation of Industrial
Disputes in New York State, 1937-40, 49 J. of Pol. Econ. 59, 76 (1941).
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The SLRB is without power to aid the employer where no question or
controversy concerning representation exists.,7 In such cases the board
has no authority to act regardless of whether the petition was filed by an
employer or by a labor organization. In Kanter Department Stores, Inc.,28
Morgantoau Seixes Co.,29 and Nostrand Service Stations,3° it dismissed
union petitions when the employer conceded the petitioning union's claim
that it represented a majority of the employees. In these three cases the
operation of this restriction upon the board's investigatory powers in-
volved no problem of public policy. But a serious problem of public pol-
icy is raised when this same restriction operates against a harassed em-
ployer seeking the aid of the board. An employer trying to maintain an
existing collective bargaining relationship with the union representing a
majority of his employees may be confronted by another union which,
while admitting that it does not represent a majority, pickets his products
and exerts other forms of direct pressure in an attempt to compel him to
break his existing contract and negotiate with it. The press has failed to
understand that the SLRB, as well as the NLRB, has no power to proceed
formally in such cases, and as a result the labor boards are accused of
being biased and of granting relief to unions while remaining indifferent
to the fate of employers. In fact, the board has accorded the same con-
sideration to employer petitions in these cases that it has granted to
petitions filed by unions, and has delayed dismissing petitions in order to
encourage direct negotiations or attempt mediation in informal confer-
ences. This virtual identity of treatment is well illustrated by the fact
that in the Old Russian Bear case, 3' both an employer's petition and a
union's petition based on the same set of facts were dismissed because
the board found no question or controversy concerning representation.
Nevertheless, the fact that the board has been obliged to dismiss some of
these cases before a settlement has been reached shows that the right of
employers to petition is not a completely adequate device for protecting
in this situation the rights of employers and employees and for maintain-
ing industrial peace.3
27 § 705(3).
28 SE-86 and SU-86A, Decision No. go (Feb. i, 1938).
29 SE-7oo, Decision No. 175 (June 14, 1938).
ao SE-g3, Decision No. 155 (May 18, 1938).
31 SEE-2592, SE-2646. In three other cases the basis for an agreement was established at
informal conferences; two others were settled by direct negotiation and the employers' peti-
tions were withdrawn.
32 The only case in which the board issued a formal decision dismissing the employer's
petition was that of Yoshio Mita, doing business as 0. & K. Sandwich Shop (SEE-4253, SE-
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There are much more cogent reasons for preventing picketing by a
minority union during the life of a certification or contract than for abol-
ishing it in the special types of single-union cases previously discussed.
While the objective of picketing in the single-union cases is to extend
collective bargaining, although at a time when the majority of employees
within the particular unit do not desire it, the objective of minority union
picketing in a case involving more than one union is to destroy the exist-
ing system of collective bargaining supported by the majority of the em-
ployees in the unit and to substitute for it a new and different system.
The ideal of collective bargaining is a system of representative govern-
ment in industry. To this end the state should discourage replacement by
employees within a particular unit of one system of industrial government
by another. Democracy within unions should be fostered; employees
should be encouraged to change union policy to meet changing needs by
activity within the union rather than by secession and formation of a new
union. 33
Moreover, an employer who is obeying the letter and spirit of the labor
relations acts by bargaining collectively with the union representing the
majority of his employees should be encouraged to continue to do so by
protection against attacks by other unions. Certainly it is illogical for
the state to impose upon the employer the obligation to bargain collec-
tively with representatives of the majority of his employees, to give that
majority the right to bargain collectively through delegates of their own
4575, Decision No. 777, June 9, i94o). In the Barry (SEE-137o) and Old Russian Bear (SEE-
2592, SE-2646) cases the employers' petitions were eventually dismissed by informal letters.
The need for legislative action to furnish some protection was emphasized when the appellate
division voided an injunction against picketing by the minority union which had been granted
by a lower court in the Old Russian Bear case. The court ruled unanimously that a labor dis-
pute within the meaning of the New York state "Norris-LaGuardia" act existed and that an
anti-picketing injunction was therefore barred. Stalban v. Friedman, 259 App. Div. 520, 19
N.Y.S. (2d) 978 (1940). Cf. note ig supra. The two opposing lines of decisions discussed in
notes xg and 2o supra indicate that the law in New York on this point is not yet settled. Two
recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court appear to support the view that cases of
this type involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act and
that minority union picketing should not be enjoined. United States v. Hutcheson, 6r S. Ct.
463 (I941), and AFL v. Swing, 61 S. Ct. 568 (i94i). For the reasons indicated below the au-
thors believe that the law on this question should be settled by an amendment to the New
York State Labor Relations Act.
33 It might be argued, however, that employees can more effectively maintain democracy
within their union if they are at all times in a position to threaten to secede from it and enter
a rival union. But is it the best method of developing stable and democratic machinery to en-
courage each group to threaten to abandon the union if its particular desires are not immedi-
ately satisfied?
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choosing, and then to allow actions, presumably legal, by third parties
designed to coerce the employer, upon whom the obligation has been
placed, and to destroy the majority's right which the state itself has
created.
Minority-union picketing might be eliminated by amendment of the
New York State Anti-Labor Injunction Act 3 4 to facilitate the granting of
injunctions in such situations. But it would not be sound public policy
to suspend the procedural safeguards of this act upon the mere allegation
of an employer that picketing was being carried on by a minority union.
A better device would be an amendment to the State Labor Relations
Act. It should define as an unfair practice picketing to compel an em-
ployer to break his contract with a union conceded by all parties to be the
representative of the majority of the employees within the appropriate
unit or certified as such by the board less than one year previously. The
amendment should also give the SLRB power to issue a cease and desist
order upon finding that such picketing was in progress. This provision
would guarantee the union a public hearing before an administrative tri-
bunal with special qualifications in handling labor disputes. During the
winter of i94o a bill authorizing the board to issue cease and desist orders
against picketing by minority unions during the life of a certification
was introduced into the Legislature on the recommendation of the Ives
Committee. 35 Because both the State Federation of Labor and the State
Industrial Council feared that it would constitute a dangerous encroach-
ment upon labor's right to picket and because certain employers felt that
it would give too much power to the board, the measure never reached the
floor of the Senate.
The major contention of opponents of any restriction on minority union
picketing is that picketing is a method of expressing opinions and publi-
cizing the facts of a dispute and that consequently any limitation of this
right would be a dangerous encroachment upon the right of free speech. 36
This contention fails to recognize that picketing is now more than a form
of self-expression. Limitations of space make it impossible for the union
34 N.Y. Civ, Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. i94o) § 876a (the New York state "Norris-
LaGuardia" act).
35 Senate Introductory No. 922 (i94o). See discussion in report of the New York State
Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Relations 27 (194o). The Ives Com-
mittee failed to deal with the larger problem of eliminating picketing where all parties-
agree that the union holding the contract represents the majority.
36 This argument has been ably presented in The Labor Injunction under NLRA, 8 Int'l
Juridical Ass'n Bull. 44-49 (1939). For another criticism of proposals to restrict minority
union picketing, see Padway, The Norris-LaGuardia Act and National Labor Relations Act,
2 Nat'l Lawyers' Guild Q. 227-45 (1940).
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to present with signs an adequate statement of its case and for the em-
ployer to reply adequately by placing signs in the windows of his estab-
lishment. Moreover, it is difficult for the consumer to ascertain the true
facts and merits of the case from these conflicting condensed versions.
Consequently a large section of the consuming public refuses as a matter
of policy to cross any picket line, regardless of the contentions of the dis-
puting parties.
Most picketing in the service industries (which constitute the largest
area of the SLRB's jurisdiction) is designed to coerce the employer by
persuading potential customers not to patronize his establishment. The
strength of such picketing as a weapon in no way varies with the merits
of the union's position. Stability of collective bargaining requires that
the use of this weapon by a minority union be eliminated. In devel-
oping a sound public policy respecting picketing and free speech (as
well as in defining Henry Ford's right to freedom of speech when ad-
dressing his employees), it is essential to draw "the line between speech
as a device to persuade and speech as a device to exercise authority;
speech as an innocent, friendly communication (though between employer
and employee) and speech as the exertion of power.' 37
The difficulties faced by the SLRB in employer petition cases should
not obscure the fact that only 164 employer petitions were filed during
the first forty-two months of the board's history and that the administra-
tive problems of sifting thousands of such petitions, long feared by the
NLRB and anticipated by the SLRB, have never materialized. Nor has
it been difficult to weed out and effectively dispose of those few petitions
filed to obtain premature elections before the unions could complete their
organizing campaigns.
THE CRAFT-UNIT PROVISO
In the campaign to amend the National Labor Relations Act much
attention has been focussed upon various proposals to limit the discretion
of the NLRB in determining the appropriate unit in order to "protect
the rights of craft groups." The AFL has supported such proposals on
the ground that the NLRB has disregarded the special interests of craft
groups and has discriminated against the AFL in favor of the CIO. Since
the CIO organizes on industrial lines, it is usually able to defeat the AFL
in an election held within an industrial unit.
The AFL at first supported the Walsh bill which provided: "That
when a craft exists, composed of one or more employees, then such craft
37 Greene, Civil Liberties and the NLRB, 8 Int'l Juridical Ass'n Bull. oo (31940).
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shall constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining
for such employee or employees; a majority of such craft employees may
designate a representative for such unit ...... ,39 Subsequently the AFL
endorsed the slightly different formulation of the proviso in the Norton
bill, namely, "That in any case where the majority of employees of a
particular craft shall so decide the Board shall designate such craft as
a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining."39 Thus it
would be mandatory for the board to determine whether a majority of em-
ployees in the craft unit desired to bargain as a separate unit and by which
union, if any, they desired to be represented. The New York act con-
tains an identical provision,40 which was included primarily because of the
influence exerted by the New York State Federation of Labor. The
AFL, however, might not so readily endorse the Norton or Smith bills
were it to realize that the New York craft-unit proviso has done as much
to thwart the organizing efforts of the AFL as to aid them.
In the very first case in which the craft-unit proviso was a factor, this
proviso was invoked by an employer in opposition to the claims of an
AFL union. In the Rockefeller Center Corp. case 4' the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers filed a petition for certification as the collec-
tive bargaining agent for a unit composed of elevator maintenance men,
plumbers, steam fitters, sheet metal workers, refrigeration men, and ma-
chinists, as well as the electricians. The employer feared that there would
be subsequent jurisdictional disputes if the IBEW were certified as rep-
38 S. iooo, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (1939).
39 H.R. 9195, 76th Cong. 3 d Sess. (194o). See 6 Lab. Rel. Rep. 212 (194o); N.Y. Times,
col. 2, p. I (April 4, 1940).
On June 7, 194o the House of Representatives passed the Smith bill after incorporating in
it at the behest of the AFL the following amendment to § 9 of the NLRA: "Whenever in a
proceeding under this section it is proposed .... (3) to include employees of a particular
employer or employers in any craft in a bargaining unit containing employees other than
employees in such craft; the Board shall take a secret ballot .... of the employees in such
craft .... for the purpose of determining whether such employees desire to be so included.
If a majority of the employees voting vote to be so included, the Board may by order include
such employees in a bargaining unit .... containing employees other than employees in such
craft ..... If a majority of the employees voting vote not to be so included, the Board shall
by order designate .... the employees in such craft .... as a separate bargaining unit."
H.R. 9195, 7 6th Cong. 3 d Sess. (194o). The bill was not passed by the Senate and so died with
the expiration of the Congress. A similar bill will, in all probability, be introduced into the
present Congress. Had this amendment been enacted, the board could have ascertained the
desires of the employees with regard to the bargaining unit only by means of an election.
The Norton bill, on the other hand, did not specify the method for determining whether the
majority of the employees desired to bargain as a separate unit in its original proposal on the
unit.
40 § 705(2). 41 SE-x55.
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resentative for all these workers. Consequently both the employer and an
"Independent" union invoked the craft-unit proviso to justify the con-
tention that the board ought to direct separate elections for the (i) elec-
tricians, (2) elevator maintenance men, and (3) mechanical employees.
The "Independent" submitted a petition which allegedly had been signed
by a majority of the employees in the electrical craft at Rockefeller Cen-
ter, requesting the board to declare the electrical department an appropri-
ate unit for collective bargaining. The IBEW apparently became con-
vinced during the course of the hearings that the board would find that
the craft was the appropriate unit, for it signed a stipulation recognizing
this and providing for three separate elections. It therefore became un-
necessary for the board formally to decide the unit question. The results
of these elections appear anomalous to anyone who has accepted at face
value the professions of faith in craft unionism made by certain AFL
leaders. In the elevator maintenance division 31 employees voted for the
IBEW and 9 against; in the mechanical maintenance division 35 em-
ployees voted for the IBEW and 3 against; but in the electrical divi-
sion the IBEW was defeated 26 to 15. In this case not only did an im-
portant AFL "craft" union organize into what was virtually an industrial
unit workers in crafts only remotely related to it, but it succeeded in or-
ganizing employees of these other crafts even though it failed to organize
those within its own craft. The IBEW may have contended that a broader
unit was appropriate because it anticipated the result, for had the board
included all the workers within a single unit, the IBEW would have won
that single election 81 to 38 and would have been certified as collective
bargaining agent for the electrical workers as well as the elevator main-
tenance and mechanical maintenance employees.42
In several other cases the craft-unit proviso has been used for another
purpose very different from that intended by AFL leaders. In the Saks
& Co. case 43 a local of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
(then an independent industrial union) contended that since the tailors
in the alteration, ready-to-wear, and special order departments of a large
department store had decided to bargain as a separate craft, it was manda-
tory for the board to designate it as the appropriate unit. At a formal
hearing the union introduced testimony that at a union meeting a major-
42 The Rockefeller Center case is not unique. In the Fred F. French case (SE-3o4g) the
employer contended at an informal conference that the unit the IBEW sought to represent
was not appropriate because it included five unrelated crafts, four of which did not come
under the jurisdiction of the electrical workers. This case, however, was eventually dismissed
for non-prosecution.
41 SE-3735.
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ity of the tailors had decided to bargain separately. Since the ILGWU
was the only union attempting to organize the employees in these three
departments, the tailors had no cause to fear that they would be included
in a larger unit. Consequently it seems likely that the ILGWU endeav-
ored to employ the craft-unit proviso to convince the board that a smaller
unit of about 75 employees (in which it happened to command a majority)
was appropriate and that the total of 360 employees in the three depart-
ments did not constitute an appropriate unit.44 Thus while an industrial
union contended that a craft unit was appropriate, the employer insisted
upon the industrial unit, that is, a unit consisting of the three depart-
ments. The board found:
A careful analysis of the entire record with respect to the craft question reveals in-
sufficient evidence to permit the Board to resolve the issue in favor of either of the con-
fficting contentions. While the record might permit a finding that there is, generally
speaking, a group of skilled handicraftsmen known as tailors, the difficulty arises in
defining the artisans employed by this particular company who are entitled to be a
part of the group. The testimony shows that the Saks tailors do pressing and finishing
work. It also shows that persons employed as drapers do tailoring work. It shows
further that the distinction between the type of garments worked on by drapers and
tailors is so tenuous as to be without real difference .....
Since for the purposes of the craft contention, we are unable to find, one way or the
other, whether the employees in this case listed as tailors are by themselves a craft, the
testimony relating to the union meeting of May 2nd on the issue of whether a majority
of the tailors decided to bargain as a craft becomes irrelevant in the present con-
nection.45
Applying the usual criteria for determination of the unit question the
SLRB found that, although a unit composed exclusively of tailors did
not constitute a craft unit, it did constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining. On the basis of union cards and pay-
roll receipts submitted at the hearing it certified the ILGWU local as the
representative of the tailors.
This commendable decision clearly reveals that the essential difficulty
is to determine which workers within a particular shop constitute a craft.
What is a craft? Can we be more precise than to say that it is "any
441n opposing the claim of Luncheonette Employees Union in the Times Square Restau-
rant, Inc. case (SE-3349) that the kitchen employees and soda-fountain employees constituted
a single craft and consequently should be designated as an appropriate unit, the employer con-
tended that this AFL local was in fact an industrial union and that it was seeking a smaller
unit in this case only because it did not feel confident of obtaining a majority of the votes of
all the employees in the establishment. The board subsequently found that the kitchen em-
ployees and the soda-fountain employees constituted two separate units and ordered an election
in each unit.
4s SE-3735, Decision No. 641, at 4 (Aug. 9, 1939).
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group of men performing similar work?" The difficulty of determining
which employees in a given shop should be included within a single craft
diminishes the danger that the board will frequently be compelled by in-
vocation of the craft-unit proviso to designate a unit in which the union
invoking the proviso happens to command a majority rather than the
appropriate unit in the light of sound public policy. On the other hand,
since this difficulty increases the complexity of the board's task in the
administration of the statute, it constitutes a major disadvantage of the
proviso. Thus there is reason to believe that inclusion of a similar proviso
in the Wagner Act would greatly increase the difficulties of administration.
It is significant that the craft-unit proviso in the New York act has
seldom been invoked. The files of the SLRB reveal only ten cases in
which the proviso definitely was a factor. Even if the application of the
proviso was discussed in other cases in the informal conference stage, the
total is a mere handful in comparison with the 3,075 representation cases
filed between July i, 1937 and March I, i94o. One reason may be that
conflicts concerning the "rights of craft groups" occur less frequently in
the service industries which constitute a large part of the jurisdiction of
the SLRB than in mass production manufacturing industries employing
small groups of skilled craftsmen and large numbers of unskilled produc-
tion workers.46 Further, the conflict between the AFL and the CIO has
not been severe in industries within the jurisdiction of the SLRB.
Another explanation may be that unions which, while originally craft
organizations, have in recent years been organizing workers of many dif-
ferent crafts virtually on an industrial basis and have been rendering only
lip service to the principles of craft unionism, have realized that the pro-
viso can operate to their disadvantage as well as to their advantage. In
some cases it is to the advantage of such "craft" unions to invoke the pro-
viso either to prevent inclusion of a small group of its members within a
larger unit in which a competing union commands a majority, or to per-
suade the board that a unit in which it happens to command a majority is
46 "Of the total number of elections and comparison cases from July z, 1937, to June 30,
1939, combined, igo were in service industries such as hotels, restaurants, laundries, auto-
mobile service, etc., 167 were among service employees in office and apartment buildings (real
estate), 54 in manufacturing, 44 in transportation, ten among employees in architects' offices
and private hospitals (professional service), seven in utilities, three in insurance and one each
among crushed stone production workers (mining and quarrying) and janitorial employees in
public schools (custodial service). Of the 78,725 workers involved in these cases, 47-5 per cent
were in the various service industries, 22.9 per cent in transportation, and 20.1 per cent in
retail restablishments." Goldberg, Elections and Certifications of Labor Organizations Con-
ducted by the New York State Labor Relations Board, July 1, 1937, to June 30, 1939, at 7-8
(1939).
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appropriate. 47 In other cases the same union may organize along industrial
lines. If the union claims representation as a craft in the former type of
case, the precedent and the definition of the craft which the board estab-
lishes may embarrass that same "craft" union in a case where it has or-
ganized vertically. Consequently the union may refrain from invoking the
proviso in cases of the first type. At least one union has actually been in-
volved in cases of both types. In the Rockefeller Center case the craft-unit
proviso was instrumental in preventing the IBEW local from obtaining
certification as representative of what amounted to an industrial unit,
but iii the Waldorf-Astoria case45 the same local contended that a craft
unit consisting of 17 electricians and helpers was appropriate. In that
case the employer opposed the designation of 17 of its 2,707 employees as
an appropriate unit, contending that it would open the way to the estab-
lishment of "342 different particular crafts conceivably represented by
as many labor organizations" and that this result would make impossible
harmonious operation of the hotel. The decision is especially significant
because the board based its finding that the electricians and their helpers
constituted an appropriate unit in part upon the fact that the union's
jurisdiction was no broader than the unit it sought.
Because it has been a factor in so few cases, the leaders of both major
labor organizations have failed to comprehend the significance and po-
tentialities of the craft-unit proviso of the New York act.49 If a craft-unit
proviso were included in the Wagner Act, it would probably be invoked
more frequently than has the New York proviso because of the greater
proportion of manufacturing industries within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. But the New York experience indicates that the groups most
47 The Charles Weisbecker case (SE-4563 ) is apparently the only case in which the craft-
unit proviso was employed by an AFL union in an attempt to obtain the exclusion of a small
group of its members from a plant-wide unit which was represented by a CIO industrial
union. This case was settled by an informal understanding between the parties. But cf. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Decision No. 114 3 -A, Dec. 3r, 194o).
48 SE-4682, Decision No. 907 (June 5, I94O).
At an informal conference in the Franklin Simon & Co. case (SE-3290) the employer ques-
tioned the appropriateness of a craft unit of shoe salesmen, contending that if this unit were
designated as appropriate, he would eventually be compelled to negotiate fifty-five separate
contracts with the representatives of fifty-five separate units of its employees. The petition
in this case was later withdrawn.
49 The AFL counsel, for example, appears to be unaware of the significance of the Saks
decision. In reviewing the Report of the New York State Labor Relations Board, July i, 1937
to December 31, 1939 (Albany, r940), which report contains (at p. 148) a quotation from the
part of that decision quoted on page 486 above, Mr. Padway said: "By this positive provision
of the law [the craft-union proviso, § 705(2)] a subject of frequent dispute has been removed
from controversy." 54 Harv. L. Rev. 720, 721 (1941).
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vociferous in demanding this amendment to the Wagner Act would derive
far less advantage from it than they now anticipate.
BALLOTING TO DETER-I THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
In the Globe cases° the NLRB declared that other considerations re-
garding the appropriate unit being evenly balanced, the determining fac-
tor should be the desires of the employees themselves. Consequently it
directed separate elections in each of the skilled groups, the members of
which were asked whether they desired to be represented by a craft
union for their separate unit or by the industrial union seeking to repre-
sent all the employees of the plant in a single unit. Depending upon the
vote of the majority, the members of each group would either constitute
a separate appropriate unit or be included in the same industrial unit
with the production employees. The latter were merely asked to indicate
whether or not they desired to be represented by the industrial union.
This procedure has been employed by the NLRB in subsequent cases in
which all other considerations concerning the appropriate unit were evenly
balanced and the record failed clearly to reveal the desires of the em-
ployees involved. The SLRB, on the other hand, has employed a dif-
ferent procedure. Although in only one cases, has it allowed a particular
group of employees to vote directly on the question of whether or not
they desired to bargain separately as a craft unit, in several cases it has
asked certain employees to indicate whether or not they desired to bar-
gain as a separate unit and secondly to indicate by which union they de-
sired to be represented. This procedure may be interpreted as an attempt
to carry out the legislative policy implicit in the craft-unit proviso.52
The chief advantage of the SLRB procedure is that it can be employed
in certain cases in which the Globe doctrine is inapplicable. In the Sads
Quality Furniture Co. case 3 the Sachs Employees Association sought to
represent in a single unit virtually all the employees of a department
store. The United Office and Professional Workers of America (CIO)
sought to represent the office and clerical employees as a separate unit,
so Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
5x Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Decision No. ii4 3 -A, Dec. 31, 194o) at 24: "Butcher
workmen .... constitute a craft within the meaning of Sec. 705 (2)."
s2In the determination of the appropriate unit the board has taken into account, among
other factors, the following: the form and degree of organization and jurisdiction of the
union, the nature of the work involved, the characteristics of the employers' business. Report
of the New York Labor Relations Board, July 1, 1937 to December 31, 1939, at 138-69 (Al-
bany, 1940).
S3 SE-17, Decision No. 39 (Dec. 17, 1937).
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but the SLRB denied it leave to intervene and refused to place its name
on the ballot because it did not file its petition and charges within a
reasonable time after the filing of the original petition by the Sachs Em-
ployees Association. The SLRB held two simultaneous elections in this
case, the ballots given the clerical and office employees being divided into
sections. Section "A" contained the question: "Do you desire to bargain
as a separate unit?" and section "B" the question: "Do you desire to be
represented by Sachs Employees Association?" The ballots for the ware-
house, maintenance, and sales employees contained only the question:
"Do you desire to be represented by Sachs Employees Association?"
Since the Globe doctrine requires employees in a certain group to choose
between two or more unions advancing conflicting contentions with re-
gard to the appropriate unit, it could not have aided the SLRB in the
Sacks case, in which only one union was involved. Had the board di-
rected a separate election to determine whether or not the office and
clerical employees desired to be represented by the association, votes
against the association cast because of lack of desire for collective bar-
gaining would have been indistinguishable from those cast against the
association because of a desire to bargain as a separate unit or because
of opposition to representation by that particular union. In response to
an inquiry by the CIO local shortly before the election, the board indicat-
ed that if the majority of the office and clerical employees voted to bargain
as a separate unit and against representation by the Sachs Employees
Association, it would immediately proceed on the basis of this local's peti-
tion to direct an election to determine whether or not the clerical and office
employees desired to be represented by the local. Actually 107 votes were
in favor of a separate unit and 137 against, while 105 were against the
Sachs, Employees Association and 139 in favor. Thus of the votes in sec-
tion "A" all but two were consistent with those in section "B." From
these results it may be concluded that at least 105 clerical and office em-
ployees desired to bargain as a separate unit to be represented by the
CIO local.5 4
54 In the Sachs case a second union was involved, although its name did not appear on the
ballot; but in the case of Cadillac Motor Car Division of General Motors Sales Corp. (SE-3 73 7,
Decision No. 557, May 27, 1939) there was no contest whatsoever between unions. Here the
employer contended that the testers and the stock clerks should not be included in the same
unit with the shop employees. The board indicated that on the basis of a card comparison
it would certify Local 259 of the UAWA (CIO) as the representative of the shop employees.
It also directed two elections at which the testers and the stock clerks were to indicate whether
or not they desired to be included in the same unit with the shop employees. These election
results enabled the board to include the stock clerks and exclude the testers from the appropri-
ate unit and to certify Local 259 as the representative of this unit. Obviously the Globe
doctrine could not have been applied.
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Another type of case in which the SLRB procedure can reveal informa-
tion unobtainable by application of the Globe doctrine is that in which a
plant unit is challenged as inappropriate but neither union seeks to repre-
sent a particular group of employees as a separate unit. An example is the
Buffalo General Laundries case,55 where the Federated Industrial Union,
an unaffiliated organization, sought to represent all production and main-
tenance employees as a single unit while Local 17 of the Laundry Workers
International Union (AFL) contended that maintenance employees should
not be in the same unit with the production employees it claimed to rep-
resent. Unable to determine the appropriate unit on the basis of the rec-
ord, the SLRB ordered a preliminary election to determine whether or not
the maintenance employees desired to bargain as a separate unit,s6 the
result being ii to 8 in favor of bargaining as a separate unit. Here the
Globe doctrine could not have determined the appropriate unit because
the union seeking to represent the smaller group of maintenance em-
ployees was an industrial union which also sought to represent the pro-
duction employees, while Local 17, which contended that maintenance
and production employees should not be included in the same unit,
claimed to represent only the production employees. The situation was
precisely the reverse of that in the Globe case. An attempted application
of the Globe doctrine would have allowed the maintenance employees to
vote for or against Federated. But in counting the ballots cast against
Federated the board could not have distinguished the votes of those de-
siring a separate unit from the votes of those who did not desire collective
bargaining.
After the preliminary election Local 17 requested to be placed on the
ballot at the second election to determine the bargaining representative
of the maintenance employees. Sixteen of the maintenance employees
voted for the Federated Industrial and two for Local 17; in a separate
election among the production employees (held simultaneously) 2 i8 voted
for the Federated and 6 for Local 17. Since at the time of these later elec-
tions both unions sought to represent all of the employees in both units,
there is little justification for the conclusion that a majority of the main-
tenance employees voted unintelligently and inconsistently for representa-
tion by an industrial union after having voted to bargain as a separate
unit. At this stage there simply was no "craft" union in the field.
Although the SLRB procedure made it possible to obtain information
concerning the desires of employees with respect to the bargaining unit
unobtainable by use of the Globe doctrine, the information yielded in this
and several other similar cases was of little practical value. There is no
SS WE-9 2. 56 Decision No. 377 (March 6, x939).
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basis in law for the contention that certification of the Federated as rep-
resentative for two separate units, the maintenance employees and the
production employees, bound it to conduct separate negotiations and
sign separate contracts for each unit, or for the assumption that there is
legally a difference between two separate certifications and a certification
as representative of a single unit.67 A contrary argument would imply that
the board may regulate internal union affairs and would obviously be
fraught with danger to the autonomy of labor organizations.
While the SLRB procedure is useful in cases where the Globe doctrine
cannot be applied, in others the Globe doctrine would have obtained the
necessary information more efficiently. In the Hearn Department Stores,
Inc. case -'5 a local of the Department Store Employees Union (CIO) pe-
titioned for certification as representative of all but the supervisory em-
ployees of the company, while a local of the Wholesale Hardware, Crock-
ery, and Housefurnishing Specialities Union (AFL) sought to represent
the warehouse employees as a separate unit. On the basis of the record
the board was unable to determine the appropriate unit. Relying on a
card comparison it therefore certified the CIO local as the representative
of the production employees and directed an election among the ware-
house employees. Section "A" of the ballot asked the warehouse em-
ployees whether or not they desired to bargain collectively as a separate
unit; section "B" asked whether they desired to be represented by the
CIO local or by the AFL local. Forty-one voted for a separate unit and
41 against, while 56 voted for the CIO local and 25 for the AFL local.
The board subsequently certified the CIO local as representative of all
employees.
Since there was a clear-cut controversy concerning inclusion of the
warehouse employees in the same unit with production employees, the
Globe doctrine could have been applied simply by allowing the ware-
house employees to choose between the CIO local and the AFL local.
The procedure actually employed made it possible for at least 15 ware-
house employees to vote for bargaining as a separate unit and also to
vote for representation by the CIO local, the industrial union59 These
s7 It should be noted that the Court of Appeals has ruled that an SLRB certification is not a
final order. Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 277 N.Y. 345, 14 N.E. (2d) 381 (1938). Of course
the union may find it expedient to give the employees in the smaller unit separate representa-
tion on the bargaining committee, to negotiate a separate contract covering them, or to grant
them some other special consideration in order to retain their loyalty.
s8 SE-976, Decision No. 128 (March 2I 1938).
s9 Apparently one employee who voted for a separate unit failed to indicate any choice in
section "B."
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contradictory votes were probably the result of a failure to comprehend
the significance of a direct vote on the unit question or of confusion caused
by the form of the ballot. Both might have been avoided by employment
of the simpler Globe technique.
The possibility that employees will fail to understand a vote on the
unit question is the major disadvantage of the SLRB procedure. It
must be admitted, however, that employees have actually voted with a
striking degree of consistency when the issue has been before them. Of
the five cases in which sufficient evidence is available, in only two did
more than 5 per cent and in none did more than x5 per cent of the em-
ployees vote inconsistently.0 Another disadvantage is that the addi-
tional information yielded by this method is not always worth the added
expense of the more complicated election procedure. This is certainly
true of elections resulting in certification of the same union as representa-
tive of the employees in two separate units. On the other hand, the SLRB
procedure does get to the heart of the controversy concerning the appro-
priate unit, and it minimizes the possibility that the central issue may
be obscured by preferences and prejudices regarding the particular unions
seeking to represent the employees. It is a democratic method of deter-
mining the appropriate unit in cases in which the Globe doctrine will not
apply, either because no union seeks to represent one group of employees
as a separate unit although it is not clear that these employees should be
included in the same unit with the other employees, or because only one
union is a party to the proceeding. The best policy for any labor board
would be to apply the Globe doctrine whenever it can yield as much in-
formation as the SLRB procedure and to employ the SLRB procedure in
all other cases."'
60 These two cases were Hearn's Department Stores (Decision No. 128, March 17, x938),
and Consolidated Laundries (Decision No. 4, Sept. 29, 1937). Virtually all of the employees
voted consistently in the Int'l R. Co. (Decision No. 507, May ix, 1939), Buffalo General
Laundries (Decision No. 377, March 6, z939), and Sachs Quality Furniture (Decision No. 39,
Dec. 17, 1937) cases. In the Int'l R. Co. case, 117 of the clerical and office employees voted to
bargain in the same unit with the operating employees and 6 in favor of a separate unit, while
117 voted for the Frontier Bus and Street Car Employees Umion, which sought to represent
all groups as a single unit, and 6 for the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 162
(CIO), which sought to represent the clerical and office employees as a separate unit. But in
this case the fact that not a single employee voted inconsistently is largely attributable to the
circumstance that the union which won the "toss" for choice of position on the ballot chose to
have its name placed on the left of section "2" of the ballot, because the name of the unit which
it sought was on the left side of section "i." It then instructed its adherents simply to place
crosses in the two boxes on the left-hand side of the ballot.
61 The conclusions stated at this point in the text are those of Mr. Arenwald. Mr. Landay
disagrees, believing that the SLRB procedure makes a spurious attempt to distinguish the unit
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THE CCIEITIIER" BALLOT AND RUN-OFF ELECTIONS
The problem of the general form of the ballot or ballots to be employed
in representation cases involving two or more unions is one of the most
difficult which confront a labor relations board. Should the voters be
allowed to choose only between the two unions involved, or should they
be permitted to indicate that they do not desire to be represented by any
of these unions? If a majority vote for a union, but no single union ob-
tains a majority of the votes, should the board conduct a second or run-off
election, and if so, what form of ballot should be used? Or should it
from the union question. An employee often cannot separate the two questions: (a) which
unit do you want? and (b) which union do you prefer? He may prefer a certain union irrespec-
tive of the unit it represents, and if required to express a preference on the unit question he
would pick that unit which, on the basis of pre-election information, appeared most likely to
lead to the designation of his favorite union. If, on the other hand, he preferred a unit in which
no union sought to represent him, he might vote for the unit advocated by the union lest no
union ever seek to represent him.
Such a situation actually did arise in an election among the employees of B. Altman & Co.,
a large New York department store, where some clerks were given the usual two-section ballot
asking if they preferred to bargain as a separate unit and, if not, whether they wished to be
represented by the industrial union. SE-2659, Decision No. 296 (Jan. 26, i939). The notice
of election informed them that if a majority voted for the separate unit no union would be
certified as their representative. A majority voted for the industrial union, but the election
does not show whether, as an abstract question without reference to any of the unions, that
majority preferred the industrial unit. Consequently, a majority vote for a separate unit
might have misled a "craft" union into supposing that the employees favored the craft form
of organization when, as a matter of fact, their votes were entirely influenced by a dislike for
the particular industrial union.
The Globe, in contrast to the SLRB ballot, does not ask the employee to make an artificial
separation between the unit and union questions. He is asked to weigh carefully all the factors,
including the appropriateness of the unit and the nature of the unions, before coming to his
conclusion, which may be expressed by a single "X" before the name of a union or of "no
union." Thus far the NLRB has not extended the Globe doctrine to cases in which only one
union seeks to represent the employees in all the different units. But this could readily be done
by giving each group a chance to choose between the union in question and "no union." If
this procedure had been used in the Sachs and Altman cases, for example, certain employees
designated by the SLRB as constituting a possible separate unit would, like the rest of the
employees, have received "Yes and No" ballots bearing the name of the industrial union. If a
majority had voted "Yes," then they would be considered part of the industrial unit; if "No,"
then no union would be designated as their representative. While these employees would have
to take into account the same factors as under the SLRB procedure, they would not be re-
quired to make a pretense at expressing a separate judgment on the unit and union questions.
Fewer statistics would result, but so would less potentially misleading information.
Mr. Landay believes that the Globe doctrine should be extended by the NLRB to determine
the appropriate unit when no union seeks to represent one group of employees even though it is
not clear that these employees should be included in the same unit with the other employees,
or when only one union is a party to the proceedings. The SLB should also adopt this pro-
cedure, and both boards should reserve the present'SLRB procedure for cases that cannot be
resolved even by the Globe doctrine in its extended form.
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eliminate the possibility of a run-off by employing some form of preferen-
tial ballot?
Although originally the NLRB made no provision for a "neither" vote,
and only the names of the competing unions were placed on the ballot,
numerous requests for "neither" ballots 2 early compelled the NLRB to
face this issue. After having decided in the RCA case63 that eligible em-
ployees who abstained from voting would be deemed to acquiesce in the
choice of the majority who voted, it realized the necessity of providing
some method of indicating a desire for no collective bargaining. Conse-
quently in the Interlake decisionk it initiated the policy of employing a
"neither" ballot in elections involving more than one union.
The New York board did not realize the need for a "neither" ballot
until about two years after the NLRB's Interlake decision. At the outset
it followed the NLRB's original policy simply because at first none of the
parties requested that a space for a "neither" vote appear on the ballot,
and it maintained this policy even though the New York act, in contrast
to the Wagner Act, expressly provides that representatives shall be se-
lected "by a majority of the employees voting in an election."61 Conse-
quently, employees opposed to union representation would thwart the
achievement of their own objective if they refrained from voting. In rep-
resentation cases involving only one union, however, employees who did
not desire collective bargaining could vote "No" on the question: "Do
you desire to be represented by Union X?" Thus the mere fact that a
second union sought to represent them was sufficient to deprive the em-
ployees of an opportunity to vote against representation by any union.
The policy of the SLRB was made even more unjust by the fact that in a
few cases in which the evidence indicated that only a bare majority of the
eligible employees desired to be represented by a union, the SLRB di-
rected, upon the affirmative request of one of the parties, that a space
for "neither" be placed on the ballot. In three out of four of these cases
the employer was the party making the request. These requests were
granted despite the fact that implicit in the act is the notion that the em-
62 By a "neither" ballot is meant a ballot which includes a space in which the employees
may indicate their desire to be represented by neither union.
63 Matter of RCA Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431 (1936).
64 Matter of Interlake Iron Corp. 4 N.L.R.B. 55 (1937).
6S § 705(x) (italics added). The corresponding section of the Wagner Act (§ 9a) merely
stipulates: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .......
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ployer should play no role in the determination of the union to represent
his employees.
In the Daniel Reeves case,66 one of the first involving two unions, the
employer requested a "neither" ballot, contending that nothing in the
record showed that the two competing unions together represented more
than a small minority of the employees. Although both unions opposed
this request, the United Retail Employees of America (CIO) was un-
able to submit membership cards or other substantial evidence to support
its contention that it represented a majority of the more than one thou-
sand sales employees, while the other union, the American Federation of
Grocery Store Employees (AFL) could submit only 230 cards, many un-
dated. The board granted the request of the employer without comment,
evading any careful consideration of its general policy with regard to the
"neither" ballot.
The nature of the exception to the general rule expressed in the Reeves
case was more dearly defined in the Aldar Realty Co. case.67 There the
Building Employees Industrial Union (CIO), the petitioner, submitted
application cards which allegedly had been signed by all the employees,
and the Building Service Employees International Union (AFL) sub-
mitted cards alleged to have been signed by a majority of the employees.
Nevertheless, the attorney for the employer formally requested that, in
the event of an election, the board provide a space on the ballot for
"neither." The board refused to grant this request because it found that
in contrast to the Reeves case the evidence here dearly showed that nearly
all the employees had expressed a desire to be represented by one or the
other of the two unions, while nothing indicated that any of them did
not desire to be represented by a union. The evidence for this decision
consisted almost exclusively of membership cards; yet the board directed
an election because it was unable to accept these same membership cards
as sufficiently accurate indications of the desires of the employees to use
them as the basis for certification.
The' original policy of the SLRB was modified by its decision in the
Johm Morrell and Co. case. 68 The board granted a request by the employer
for a "neither" ballot despite evidence that 34 of the 6o employees, or an
actual majority, had indicated through membership applications a pref-
erence for one union or the other. The board based its decision on evi-
dence consisting of application cards, which indicated that sixteen em-
66 SE-gi6. Decision No. I34A (April I5, 1938).
67 SE-329, Decision No. 177 (June 17, I938).
68 SE-12o4, Decision No. 291 (Jan. 12, 1939).
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ployees had applied for membership in both unions, duplications which
certainly tended to establish the unreliability of this evidence. Here, as
in the previous cases, the board sidestepped consideration of the more
general problems. 69
In October, 1939, the SLRB finally realized the injustice of its original
policy and made a complete about-face. In a dearly reasoned decision,
the SLRB stated in the Hotel St. George Corp. case70 that:
The Act likewise endows workers with equally complete freedom to refrain from such
self-organization and to declare that such is the desire or preference of the major-
ity .....
In elections in which two or more labor organizations lay claim to certification as
exclusive collective bargaining representatives, the employees are entitled to express
their desires on a ballot which will accord them precisely the same right they enjoy
when a single union is concerned, i.e., to select one of the rival organizations to repre-
sent them or expressly to reject all these organizations.T'
The board overruled the Aldar and Morrell decisions by rejecting the use
of union membership cards as evidence for deciding whether or not to
order a "neither" ballot. It explained:
Because, under the circumstances of this case, we could not accept these cards as
final and unmistakable indications of the real desire of the employees, our first Direc-
tion of Election was issued. Similarly we are unable to accept the cards as an infallible
indication of the number of employees who do not desire to be represented by the
council or by Local 28.72
In this important decision not only did the SLRB enunciate its present
policy of providing an opportunity for a "neither" vote at all elections
involving more than one union, but also it announced that where a ma-
jority of the employees voting favored a union, but no single union ob-
tained a majority, it would order a run-off between the unions on the
ground that the first election revealed a majority for collective bargaining.
This form of run-off election had previously been ordered in the Reeves
case, where use of the "neither" ballot resulted in a majority of voters
casting their ballot for one or the other of the two unions without either
the CIO or AFL local obtaining a majority. The run-off procedure was
unfavorably criticized by the CIO union and the company. The union
contended that since the AFL local had received the smallest number of
'9 Before October, 1939, the SLRB also directed that a "neither" ballot be employed in the
Cross & Brown (SE-673 , Decision No. 306, Dec. 19, 1938) and City Provision Co. (SE-7o9,
Decision No. 384, March 3, 1939) cases. The latter was the only case in which the board did
not order a "neither" ballot solely at the request of the employer.
1' SEc3353
.71 Decision No. 655-B3 (Oct. 10, 1939). 72 Ibid.
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votes at the original election, it should have been eliminated from a fur-
ther determination; the company contended that some who had voted
for a given union might prefer no collective bargaining to representation
by the rival union. Apparently the board was unable effectively to defend
its plan in the face of this attack, for it withdrew its order for an im-
mediate election. No run-off was ever conducted, for the case eventually
died of old age.
In the Hotel St. George case the SLRB finally arrived at the "neither"
ballot policy adopted about two years earlier by the NLRB in the Inter-
lake case. On the other hand, not until five months after the Hotel St.
George decision did the NLIRB abandon its original policy, which merely
allowed employees to indicate in a run-off election whether or not they
desired to be represented by the union receiving a plurality at the original
election, and adopt the SLRB's policy of a run-off between the two
unions.7 3
The Hotel St. George decision assumes that a vote at the original elec-
tion for either of the unions is an indication of a desire for collective bar-
gaining through some representative. There may be cases in which inter-
union antipathy would cause a substantial number of the supporters of
each union, if compelled to choose between the opposing union and no
collective bargaining at all, to prefer the latter. But a policy allowing for
this 6ontingency would involve practical difficulties. The desires of the
employees could then be accurately determined only by conducting two
yes-or-no run-offs on the question of representation by each of the unions
and then possibly a third run-off between the unions or alternatively by
the use of a complete preferential ballot. The method of successive run-
offs has obvious disadvantages. It would prolong the period of uncertainty
and the strife accompanying the campaigns of competing unions. Ex-
traneous factors might alter the desires of employees during the period of
run-off elections. The union receiving the minority of the votes at its
run-off might request a delay in order to regain prestige. And finally, the
cost to the board and the parties of as many as four separate elections
would be excessive.
The chief disadvantage of the complete preferential ballot is the likeli-
hood of its degenerating into the ordinary type of multiple choice ballot
if enough voters realize that refraining from indicating a second choice
73 R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Co. and Cincinnati Electric Tool Co., 22 N.L.R.B. No. 17
(i94o). During the fall of 194o, when the board lacked a chairman, this policy was continued
because Dr. Leiserson, who has always opposed run-off elections, agreed to the practice "until
that practice can be reconsidered by a three-member board." 27 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (1940).
As of March i, 1941, no decision on this issue has been madesince Dr. Millis became chairman.
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will decrease the chance of any other group's obtaining a majority and in-
crease the strength of their own first choice.74 Any attempt to compel in-
dication of a second choice might create resentment and misunderstand-
ing, leading to a large number of spoiled ballots. A second disadvantage
is that the complexity of the method makes it more difficult for the
workers to understand the mechanics of the election and thus diminishes
the probability that they will accept the election results as decisive. Third,
this method makes it possible for more than one union to obtain a com-
bined total of first and second choices constituting a majority of the bal-
lots cast and thus to claim certification.
If the present split in the labor movement did not render it politically
inexpedient, both the NLRB and the SLRB might proceed on the as-
sumption that employees who vote for a particular union would prefer
representation by a competing union to no collective bargaining. The
contrary assumption results in practical difficulties, and, moreover, there
is evidence that the rank and file of the average labor organization do not
hate a competing union as bitterly as do some of the leaders. A plan sug-
gested by the authors based on this assumption would settle all issues in
every case by a single election.
Let those voting for "neither" have the opportunity of expressing as
their second choice a preference for one of the two unions in the event that
a majority of the employees vote for collective bargaining. If the vote
for the unions constitutes a majority but neither union obtains a major-
ity, then only would the second choices of the "neither" voters be added
to the respective totals of the two unions. Should this addition give one
union an absolute majority, that union should be certified. It is possible,
however, that many "neither" voters, either through lack of interest or
because of a definite desire to do nothing to help a union, will refrain from
indicating their second choices. Consequently even the second choices
might not give either union a majority. In that event the board should
certify that union which received a majority of the votes in favor of col-
lective bargaining, that is, the union obtaining a plurality of all the
votes.75 This plan would permit the "neither" voters to express a union
preference if they desired but would not allow them to sabotage the elec-
tion machinery by refusing to indicate a second choice. Moreover, under
this plan it is impossible for more than one union to obtain a combined
74 Cf. Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation 489 (1926).
7S The "neither" ballots containing no indication of a second choice would merely have
shown that less than a majority of those voting did not desire to be represented by either
labor organization.
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total of first and second choices representing a majority of all the ballots
cast75 It is improbable, however, that the courts could reconcile certifi-
cation of a union obtaining a plurality with the existing provision of the
act that the board shall certify the representatives selected by the major-
ity of the employees voting in an election.
' An alternative plan, suggested by members of the SLRB staff and
adopted by the parties in the Red Hook Houses case,7 could be more easily
reconciled with this provision. On a two-part ballot, the employees were
asked to vote in section "A" whether or not they desired to be represented
by a union, and in section "B" which of the two unions they preferred.
The originators of this plan claimed that if a majority voted "Yes" in sec-
tion "A," but the number of votes polled by the union which received a
majority in section "B" was less than a majority of the votes cast in sec-
tion "A," the board would be justified in certifying that union on the
ground that there had been two separate elections and that the union had
been selected by a majority of the employees voting in the second.
An advantage of this plan is that it places dearly before the employees
the fundamental question of whether or not they desire collective bar-
gaining. Moreover, if any voter, regardless of how he had voted in
section "A," were permitted and encouraged to indicate a choice of rep-
resentatives in section "B," those desiring no collective bargaining could
indicate their preference between the unions in the event that a majority
voted for collective bargaining. Although the stipulation in the Red Hook
Houses case does not indicate whether the board was to count the votes
in section "B" of those who voted against collective bargaining in sec-
tion "A," there is good reason for including them. The balloting having
determined that there is to be collective bargaining, no voters should be
deprived of an opportunity to join in selecting their representatives merely
because of their primary preference for no collective bargaining. On the
other hand, if, as in the Red Hook Houses case, a majority vote against
collective bargaining in section "A," the board may dismiss the petition
without tallying the votes in section "B."
The disadvantages of this plan are: (i) that it increases the complexity
of the election machinery78 and (2) that it makes the same questionable
76 Since a minority have voted for "neither," the total number of second choices to be dis-
tributed must be a minority of the total ballots cast. No matter in what proportions this
minority is distributed, only one of the two unions involved can be selected by a majority of
the employees voting.
77 SE-26og. Since this was a consent election, the board did not decide the form of the
ballot.
78 By making it necessary to tally two sets of votes in every election involving more than
one union in which a majority vote for collective bargaining.
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assumption that a vote for collective bargaining and for one union is still
a vote for collective bargaining even though the other union may win
the election. To circumvent the consequences of this assumption a union
expecting defeat might request its adherents to vote for no collective bar-
gaining in the first section of the ballot, in the hope that there would be
sufficient other employees opposed to collective bargaining to prevent
the "majority" union from being certified. In short, this scheme pre-
supposes that the two sections of the ballot are separable in the voter's
mind. It possesses no advantages over the ballot previously described
except, perhaps, from the legal standpoint.
None of the schemes thus far discussed-the successive run-offs, the
full preferential ballot, the ballot giving "neither" voters a choice of
unions, or the Red Hook Houses ballot-is dearly legal either under the
New York State Labor Relations Act 79 or under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.8" But assuming the law to be amended or otherwise modified,
what election procedure or procedures should be authorized? 8' There are
really but two choices, because all the single elections proposed are essen-
tially preferential ballots with restrictions on certain voters. One ballot,
for example, permits indication of a second choice only by those whose
first choice was "neither," and the Red Hook Houses ballot amounts in
practice to the same thing.12 The run-off which eliminates the choice re-
ceiving the least votes differs from preferential balloting only in requiring
a second election to determine the second choices.
In selecting a ballot form, it is clear that the procedure making the
least assumptions as to an employee's choice is best. Since all the re-
stricted ballots make some assumption as to the second choices of cer-
tain voters they are inferior in this respect to the full preferential ballot.
79 § 705(I).
:0 § ga as interpreted by the board in the RCA Mfg. Co. case, 2 N.L.R.B. 431 (1936).
I Still another alternative has been urged by Dr. Leiserson in his dissenting opinions (Coos
Bay Lumber Co., i6 N.L.R.B. 476 (i939), and the R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Co., 22
N.L.R.B. No. 17 (I94O)): to close the case temporarily and to tell each union to request
another election when it has won sufficient additional adherents to "make a prima facie showing
that it is the designated representative of a majority of the employees." But this procedure
would defeat one of the chief objectives of the Wagner Act: to substitute an election for the
organizing strike, for to gain recognition as rapidly as possible one of the unions might call
such a strike. Also the run-dff or preferential ballot does not usually require an employee
to transfer his allegiance from one union to the other (as Dr. Leiserson contends), but merely
forces the "neither" voters to participate in selecting their collective bargaining representative.
81 It is impossible for an employee to vote for a union as his first choice and for "no union"
as his second. If union X is his first choice, he can mark his ballot consistently only by voting
for collective bargaining in the "A" section and for union X in the "B" section. There is no
place for him to indicate an additional preference.
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On an unrestricted preferential ballot an employee can vote for one union
and, as a second choice, for "no union."
While the run-off procedure is simpler than preferential voting, it has
two serious disadvantages. It is much slower; at least a month elapses be-
fore the run-off election can be held, while the results of the preferential
balloting take little if any longer to compute than those of the original
election. Secondly, in the interim between the two elections the voters
may change their minds in response to a "band wagon" effect, which is
much more likely to appear in a labor than in a political election. In the
latter a person's stand, even if it becomes known, is unlikely to affect
him in a vital way, while his position in a union election, which he can
hardly conceal from his fellow employees, may easily influence his em-
ployment opportunities. An employee has reason to know that by voting
for the minority union he takes the risk that his grievances will be ignored
by the victorious union. Only the necessity of educating employees in
marking a preferential ballot should cause the NLRB to hesitate in adopt-
ing it. The SLRB should have little hesitancy in regard to elections held
in New York City where two City Councils have already been elected by
preferential balloting.
The operation of the New York State Labor Relations Act during its
first three years has shown that granting to employers an extensive right
to petition does not create unusually difficult administrative problems.
It has shown that a craft-unit proviso does add a complex problem in the
determination of the appropriate unit and is anything but advantageous
to some organizations which have favored including it in the state and
national acts. The SLRB has intelligently administered these provisions
and has also pioneered in the development of valuable procedures for
allowing employees to vote on the unit question and for run-off elections.
